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Abstract: This paper analyses and compares the transnational learning processes in the employment field in the 
European Union and among the Nordic countries. Based theoretically on a social constructivist model of learning and 
methodologically on a questionnaire distributed to the relevant participants, a number of hypotheses concerning 
transnational learning processes are tested. The paper closes with a number of suggestions regarding an optimal 
institutional setting for facilitating transnational learning processes. 
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1. Introduction 
The overall aim of this paper is to compare the learning processes that have characterized European and Nordic policy 
cooperation in the employment field. While Nordic experiences with transnational learning processes go back many 
years, they are relatively unknown to both the broader public and research communities. On the other hand, the 
European learning processes have been widely studied over the last 4-5 years. 
 
The parallel learning processes at the European and Nordic levels in the employment field both take place in separate 
committees, and they are processes independent of one another, even though there are examples of personnel 
overlapping in one or two cases.ii At the same time, there are a number of differences, as European cooperation in the 
employment field is based upon the Treaty of the European Union with the Council of Ministers as a strong political 
actor. On the other hand, the Nordic cooperation in the employment field is more loosely organized, with the Nordic 
Council of Ministers as a much weaker political actor.  As will be demonstrated, however, drawing comparisons 
between the Nordic transnational learning processes and the learning processes of the EU Member States – where 
transnational learning processes or the “mutual learning”iii processes (as they were referred to at the Lisbon summit in 
2000) are the raison d’être of the so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC) – serves to highlight a number of 
advantages and disadvantages in both cases. This is due to the contrasting institutional arrangements surrounding the 
two ways of promoting transnational learning processes. Through the analysis of these contrasting institutional 
surroundings, it becomes possible to approach an explanation of what facilitates and what impairs transnational learning 
processes. 
 
More specifically, the purpose of this paper is to address three questions concerning transnational or “mutual learning” 
processes in the EU and among the Nordic countries: first, what characterizes the mutual learning processes of the 
OMC in the EU employment field? Second, what characterizes transnational learning processes among the Nordic 
countries in their joint efforts concerning employment? Third, and most importantly, when comparing the experiences 
with learning processes in the EU and among the Nordic countries, what are the reasons for the apparent differences in 
how mutual or transnational learning processes are most efficiently diffused among a group of Member States?  
 
However, a necessary point of departure for addressing these three questions is a concrete understanding of what 
actually constitutes learning. This question will therefore be dealt with in the following section. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 contains an analysis of the discussion of analytical approaches to learning 
in recent literature and presents the model which will serve as the theoretical framework for the subsequent analysis in 
this paper. Section 3 analyses European learning processes in the employment field, and, especially, the learning 
processes taking place in the European Employment Committee. In section 4, the Nordic learning processes in the 
employment field are analysed. Section 5 presents a comparison between the Nordic and the European experiences with 
the promotion of learning in the employment field. Section 6 is the conclusion. 
 
2. What is Learning? 
In recent years, the literature in the field of international relations on transnational learning or mutual learning has 
grown significantly. As pointed out by several scholars (e.g. Levy, 1994 and Flockhart, 2004), however, the field 
represents a minefield of conceptual and methodological problems, as learning is difficult to define, isolate, measure 
and apply empirically.  
 
In another paper (Nedergaard, 2005), I have argued in favour of a social constructivist approach in which learning is 
defined as “shifts or change in the language-constituted relations to one another.” This means that learning is when 
relevant actors accept or become convinced that new concepts or combinations of concepts are more suitable as 
descriptions of the social reality, e.g. when decision-makers accept that “early activation” is an instrumental concept for 
avoiding long-term unemployment, or when decision-makers accept that “increased labour supply” represents a 
challenge that will help remedy – not exacerbate – the problem of unemployment. According to the approach to 
learning presented above, learning is when people give meaning to the world through new conceptsiv based on their 
interactions with others. Hence, our understanding of the world is a continued social process of reproduction and 
negotiation, which is embedded in language. If this social constructivist definition of learning is accepted, there are 
several factors influencing the potential for learning.  
 
First, a precondition for learning is contact to other people in some manner or another. At the same time, of course, the 
frequency of contacts is an important precondition for learning processes to take place. In the case of this paper, where 
the object of research is the working of a committee, a proxy for this precondition for learning might be the extent to 
which the committee meets on a regular basis and whether or not members participate in these meetings.  
 
Moreover, for analytical purposes, factors that influence the potential for learning understood as language-constituted 
changes due to harmonization through the acceptance of new shared concepts can be organized along two different 
dimensions, i.e. as factors that are internal and external to the committee.  
 
External processes can create conditions that facilitate either the harmonization or fragmentation of concepts, thereby 
either supporting or limiting the potential for learning. By harmonization of new concepts, I mean that new concepts are 
accepted as suitable descriptions of the social world, e.g. in the employment field. On the other hand, the flipside of the 
harmonization coin is fragmentation, meaning that there are no broadly accepted concepts as descriptions of the social 
world in a given social context, e.g.a committee on employment policy. Firstly, actors in the external environment may 
restrict or expand the room for manoeuvre available to the members of a committee. If the external environment 
constrains the scope for “conceptual manoeuvring” for the committee members (e.g. by imposing narrow political 
mandates), then the fragmented positions within the organization are sustained, professional knowledge consisting of 
new concepts is not diffused, and, hence, the potential for learning is impaired. By contrast, if the actors in the external 
environment allow a larger scope for “conceptual manoeuvring”, learning processes may be facilitated (cf. 
Wittgenstein, 1953: § 143). I propose that the proxies of the room for manoeuvre are, on the one hand, the degree of 
“up-stream” fragmentation, i.e. the degree to which the committee in question is obliged to prepare meetings at the 
political level and, therefore, is forced to allow the discussion to rely heavily on political mandates; on the other hand, 
the degree of “down-stream” fragmentation, i.e. the degree of detailed interest expressed by the relevant politicians in 
the work carried out by the committee. 
 
As explained by mainstream organization theory, another condition that may facilitate learning is the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding a committee (Mintzberg, 1979). If the level of uncertainty is great, learning can be expected to 
be facilitated, as the actors in the committee will be less confident in their previous standard operating procedures and 
more susceptible to new solutions to their problems (cf. Simon in Nedergaard, 2001: 65). Conversely, if the level of 
uncertainty is low, learning processes will be impaired, as members will be satisfied with their already existing 
knowledge. A proxy for the level of uncertainty is the existence or absence of political failure as it could be argued that 
political failure, more than anything else, is what renders actors susceptible to innovative solutions. Additionally, in the 
particular case of European and Nordic cooperation in the employment field, political failure is tantamount to the 
(perception of the) unemployment rate. In other words, learning is more likely when facing a high unemployment rate. 
 
However, processes internal to the committee may also support or impair learning processes.v For example, the 
existence of a common set of accepted concepts among the members of the committee implies that the members will be 
able to relate to one another’s knowledge of already existing concepts (cf. Wittgenstein, 1953: § 570). Of course, the 
harmonization of concepts only involves learning if and when this harmonization results from open and free 
“argumentative competition” based upon good and bad domestic practices, as opposed to harmonization due to a 
political dictate. In reality, argumentation in most committees is a combination of both, however, at varying degrees 
leaving open a differing scope for “conceptual manoeuvring”. A proxy for harmonization (or lack thereof) in the use of 
concepts in a committee may be a common professional background (or lack thereof) for the members of the 
organization. At the same time, officials participating in international cooperation at the generalist level normally have 
an academic background in the social sciences (though, of course, this background can be varied). Therefore, this proxy 
might not be of any great value in order to test differences as far as learning is concerned unless this hard data is 
combined with detailed interviews. 
 
Another possible condition for facilitating learning inside a committee is having an authoritative persuader within the 
committee (authority is possibly used here as a hybrid of Weber’s bureaucratic authority and charismatic authority). 
Authority based on professional knowledge and a refined and broadly accepted set of concepts might support learning, 
as other members will be more susceptible to the concepts in arguments made by actors with this kind of authority. A 
proxy for the degree of authority a member of an organization may possess is the length of his or her membership in the 
committee or any other extraordinary social or professional attributes such as being recognized for possessing analytical 
knowledge considerably above normal. However, a problem with this proxy is that it might require a detailed study to 
discern who is an authoritative persuader in a committee and what influence he or she actually has. 
 
The figure below contains a model that presents the potential for learning as determined by external and internal 
processes in which learning is conceptualised negatively in terms of the fragmentation of concepts (i.e. there are no 
broadly accepted concepts as descriptions of the social world in a given social context) and positively in terms of the 
harmonization of concepts (i.e. new concepts are accepted as suitable descriptions of the social world) or, in other 
words, as changes in language-constituted relations to other actors. 
 It is important not to mix the internal and external analytical perspectives on what facilitates or constrains learning. 
Each of these two aspects may work as a constraining factor on the overall learning in a committee. For instance, the 
extent of learning in a committee with both an authoritative persuader and members with a common professional 
background may remain quite limited by factors such as narrow political mandates and detailed political interest in what 
is transpiring within the committee. Consequently, the analytical division between internal and external factors is 
essential for making correct prescriptions as to what may maximize learning procedures in committees.  
 
Figure: Model for analysing the potential for learning 
 
Fragmentation 
 
3) Limited potential for mutual learning 4) No potential for mutual learning 
1) Large potential for mutual learning 2) Limited potential for mutual learning 
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The model above presents the dynamics of mutual learning as a result of internal and external constraints for the 
harmonization or fragmentation of concepts. In short, internal constraints facilitating learning include participants with 
a common professional background; having an authoritative persuader in the group; and a high frequency of meetings. 
External pressures facilitating learning are insulation from the political level and the perception of political failure. In 
the model above, the first quadrant represents a large learning potential (i.e. a potential for harmonization of concepts), 
whereas the second and third quadrants represent limited potentials for learning, and the fourth quadrant indicates that 
learning is impossible. Naturally, the movements between the four squares in the model may be interpreted as a 
continuum. 
 
Based on the model for analysing the potential for learning, five hypotheses concerning possible independent variables 
in the learning processes of the European cooperation and Nordic cooperation in the employment field can be 
established.  
 
This paper seeks to analyse these five hypotheses on the basis of qualitative analysis and quantitative data accumulated 
via a questionnaire distributed to members of the European Employment Committee (in short EMCO) and the Nordic  
Committee of Senior Officials for Labour Market and Working Environment Policy (the so-called EKA). 
 
A working hypothesis can be derived at the empirical level from each of the theoretical determinants of learning: 
 
Hypothesis 1): learning is more likely when a group 
meets repeatedly 
 
Working hypothesis: More meetings lead to higher scores on the learning 
index. 
Data and test: Independent variable: times respondents have 
attended meetings and frequency. 
Dependent variable: composite learning index. 
 
Hypothesis 2): learning is more likely when a group 
is insulated from direct political pressure 
 
Working hypothesis: The perceived interest of the minister and state 
secretary is inversely proportionate to the score on 
the learning index. 
Data and test: Independent variables:  
a) The degree to which the agenda is governed by 
the ministerial meetings or not.  
b) Perceived interest from minister and state 
secretary. 
Dependent variable: composite learning index.  
 
Hypothesis 3): learning is more likely when a group 
member is confronted by clear evidence of political 
failure. 
 
Working hypothesis:  Higher than average unemployment causes 
respondents to be more susceptible to learning and 
thus increases their ranking on the learning index.  
Data and test: Independent variable: unemployment rate in country 
of respondent compared to average. 
Dependent variable: composite learning index. 
 
Hypothesis 4): learning is more likely in groups in 
which individuals share a common professional 
background. 
 
Working hypothesis: A higher proportion of the group sharing the same 
professional background results in a higher score on 
the learning index. 
Data and test: Independent variable: share of the participants with 
same background. 
Dependent variable: composite learning index. 
 
Hypothesis 5): learning is more likely when an 
authoritative member is the persuader. 
 
Working hypothesis: Having an active senior participant in the group 
increases the score on learning index.   
Data and test: Independent variable: number of active senior 
participants in the group.  
Dependent variable: composite learning index. 
 
 
The testing of the five hypotheses is based upon both qualitative and (where possible) quantitative data. The dependent 
variable in all five instances is a composite learning index that will be established in order to compare the learning 
processes among the EU Member States as well as among the Nordic countries. 
 
3. Data on European Learning Processes in the Employment Field 
Basically, the European Employment Strategy (EES) adheres to the following sequence: guidelines 
– indicators – national plans – evaluation – peer reviews. At the end of “the EES year”, the 
Commission and the Council conclude on which problems Member States are not addressing and 
issue recommendations for policy reform. The cornerstone of the organization of the EU European 
Employment Strategy is the Employment Committee (EMCO), which is the committee that 
coordinates and discusses all elements of the EES. 
 
Since the construction of the EES processes, there has been continuous debate concerning their effect and impact. In 
2002, the Commission conducted a comprehensive review of the first five years of EES operations. This report was 
positive, concluding that, “there had been significant changes in national employment policies,” and that, “the Strategy 
has brought a shift in national policy formulation and focus – away from managing unemployment, towards managing 
employment growth” (Commission, 2002). Among EES scholars, Kerstin Jacobsson (2003) has also pointed out a 
number of positive effects of the EES. She concludes that the most important effect thus far has been that it has fostered 
“a cognitive consensus” around common challenges, objectives, and policy approaches. At a more general level, Borrás 
& Jacobsson (2004) have argued on “policy learning” that “the development of common discourses, establishing certain 
key concepts as well as policy principles and understanding of causal linkages, has been instrumental in the 
development of the new policy co-ordination processes.” Other scholars, however, have been much more critical about 
the evaluation of the EES; it appears as though “there is no academic consensus yet either on whether the strategy 
works or – if it does – how it brings about change” (Trubek & Trubek, 2003: 13).  
 
At the end of 2003, an investigation took place concerning, among other things, the learning effects of the EES. The 
basis for this investigation was a questionnaire distributed to all of the EMCO members (Ørnsholt & Vestergaard, 
2003). The members – and the social partners – were asked about the learning effects at the national level resulting from 
the EES.  
 
On the basis of the response from 21 of a total of 41 EMCO members, a composite learning index was constructed. The 
composite learning index consists of three different indicators based on questions regarding how often respondents have 
learned something new from the European cooperation in the employment field; how often they have reconsidered or 
changed their preferences as a result of ideas, knowledge or documentation obtained at the meetings; and how often 
ideas and experiences from other EU Member States have made a strong impression on them.    
 
The exact wording of the three questions is the following:  
1) “How often have you or your national colleagues learned anything new from the Open Method of 
Coordination, about which methods and policies are the best in dealing with employment policies?” 
2) “How often have ideas and experiences from other member states made a strong impression on 
you or your national colleagues?” 
3) “How often have ideas, knowledge, and documentation from the Open Method of Coordination 
made you or your national colleagues reconsider or change your preferences concerning the choice 
of employment policies in your country?” 
 
Participants could rate their response from “Very often” (= 5 points) to “Never” (= 1 pointvi) or “Don’t know” (= 6, 
subsequently eliminated), and as all three indicators contain variables designating the same scale, the learning index can 
be constructed by simple addition, thereby creating an index with a minimum value of 3 points (no learning) and a 
maximum value of 15 points (maximal learning).    
 
However, the tests of partial correlations between the three indicators do raise some preliminary questions. In order to 
ensure that the index indicators are in fact measuring the same dimension without being redundant, partial correlations 
ought to have a gamma-valuevii between 0.3 and 0.8. 
 This holds for the relationship between the questions concerning “New knowledge” (question 1 above) and 
“Preferences” (question 3 above), and between the questions concerning “Strong impression” (question 2 above) and 
“New knowledge” with gamma-correlations of 0.844 and 0.538, respectively. However, the partial correlation for the 
questions concerning “Strong impression” and “Preferences” is much weaker, the gamma value being 0.262, indicating 
that they are not measuring quite the same thing.viii  
 
The wording of the question could be a probable cause, as “Strong impression” could imply both negative and positive 
impressions. Moreover, while positive strong impressions can be regarded as indicative of learning, the opposite might 
be true of negative impressions, because they entail the harmonization of fewer concepts.  
 
As I have argued elsewhere (Nedergaard, 2005), a methodology using questionnaires might generally underestimate the 
potential learning effects stemming from the EES. Instead, a methodology based on a social constructivist approach to 
learning would have analysed the main discourses in the employment field in the various Member States, the rise in and 
hegemony of new concepts in the policy debate etc. On the other hand, the primary aim in this paper is to analyse the 
learning processes among the EU Member States compared to the learning processes among the Nordic countries. In 
other words, I am looking for differences between the international institutional arrangements as far as learning 
processes are concerned and how these differences might influence the learning processes, where learning processes are 
mainly understood as possibilities for harmonization to take place in the EMCO. Hence, it is of no importance whether 
or not the methodology used underestimates learning effects, because I assume that the underestimations in the EU and 
the Nordic countries are of similar size.  
 
The 21 respondents from EMCO who had answered all of the questions regarding learning in Ørnsholt & Vestergaard 
(2003) had a group mean of 9.3 on the learning index, with the minimum score being six and the maximum score being 
12. As mentioned above, the full possible range on the composite learning index is from a value of three to a value of 
15. In this paper, I suppose that what is meant by transnational or mutual learning processes is, in fact, that all 
participating countries stand to learn from participating in the work of the same committee. This does not mean that all 
countries have learned the same and that all countries have learned to the same extent. In order to test the hypothesis in 
the rest of this section, the differences in the position of the countries on the composite learning index becomes 
important.   
 
Therefore, based on the composite learning index above and as a necessary digression of the overall argumentation, it 
can be concluded that learning effects in Denmark and the Netherlands could be judged to be small. As far as Belgium, 
the UK, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Germany and Austria are concerned, the EMCO members experienced moderate learning 
effects. A third group of Member States were France, Finland and Sweden, where the EMCO members had experienced 
relatively high learning effects according to the questionnaire responses, cf. the table below.  
 
Table: Composite Learning Index for EMCO Member States  
Member State 
 
Composite learning index 
Sweden 12 
France 10.5 
Finland 10.5 
UK 10 
Germany 10 
Belgium 10 
Italy 9.5 
Ireland 9 
Greece 9 
Spain 9 
Austria 9 
Denmark 8 
Netherlands 7 
 
Source: Ørnsholt & Vestergaard (2003).  
 
 
After this digression, I will now return to the main line of argumentation in this paper. As a result of the model of 
learning (or lack of learning) presented earlier in this paper, five hypotheses were presented as explanations of the 
learning processes taking place. In the rest of this section, these hypotheses are considered in turn based on the 
qualitative and quantitative data: 
 
Re hypothesis 1): learning is more likely when a group meets repeatedly. 
 
The EMCO meets repeatedly and normally four times annually for a one-day meeting in Brussels. 
The precondition for learning, namely that the group meets repeatedly, is, therefore, fulfilled. Under 
the EMCO, an Indicator Group and a so-called Re Hoc Committee are established. The work of 
these groups, however, is closely connected to the work in the EMCO; their tasks are merely to 
support and prepare the EMCO work.  
 
Upon reviewing the results of the questionnaire, it became apparent that this measure was somewhat skewed, as most of 
the respondents had participated in more than five meetings, earning them a maximal score of 4 (scores ranging from 1 
for 0 meetings to 4 for 5+ meetings). A gamma test did reveal a moderate positive correlation of 0.541 between the 
number of attended meetings and the score on the learning index; however, this correlation was not significant, as the p 
value was higher than 0.05, at 0.124.  
 On the other hand, simply comparing means may provide an impression of data: respondents who had attended one or 
two meetings had a learning index mean of 8.33 (n=3), whereas the respondents who had attended three or four 
meetings had a learning index score of six (probably an outlier), and the large group of respondents who had attended 
more than five meetings had a mean score on the learning index of 9.64 (n=17). This is an (admittedly impressionistic) 
indication that having attended more meetings may increase the respondents’ score on the learning index.    
 
Concerning Hypothesis 1, I conclude that it has been confirmed. 
 
Re hypothesis 2): learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political pressure. 
 
The EMCO meetings are closely linked to the preparation of the meetings in the Council of 
Ministers. They are therefore normally held roughly a fortnight prior to these meetings. In other 
words, the EMCO agenda is almost completely governed by the political agenda of the ministers.  
 
All of the points on the agenda of the Council of the Ministers pertaining to employment and 
dealing with questions under the Open Method of Coordination are discussed by the EMCO, which 
also issues notes to the ministers accounting for its opinions; these opinions are generally endorsed 
by the Council of Ministers. This ministerial endorsement hardly comes as a surprise, however, as 
they are usually briefed prior to the Council meetings by the very same civil servants who have 
taken part in the EMCO meetings. The actual negotiations in the EMCO are also highly politicised. 
Most EMCO members either negotiate based on a “soft mandate” (= the member negotiates in the 
“spirit” of the minister) or a “hard” mandate (= the member negotiates on the basis of instructions 
accepted by the minister). The so-called EMCO support team normally produces the documents 
discussed at the EMCO meetings, this support team being the de-facto EMCO secretariat. The 
support team consists of officials from the Commission.  
 
The Commission also directly participates in the EMCO meetings,ix where they play a situation-
defining role even though an elected representative from one of the Member States always holds the 
presidency. The Commission representative (which is the general secretary or deputy general 
secretary of the General Directorate for Employment and Social Affairs) normally presents his or 
her own view concerning the point on the agenda as the first speaker. This also means that the 
EMCO debates are often based on a verbal presentation by the Commission. While the Commission 
plays the situation-defining role, it does not possess the status of being an actor with professional 
authority. The majority of the EMCO members perceive the Commission as a political player 
among others in the EMCO. Very often, the following discussions in the EMCO meetings are also 
akin to a political dogfight from word-to-word and sentence-to-sentence as concerns the 
recommendations issued to the ministers as cover notes regarding the various reports from the 
Commission.  
 
The conclusion concerning Hypothesis 2 is that it is difficult to substantiate whether or not it has 
been confirmed. However, there might be some evidence that the lack of learning processes taking 
place among the European Union Member States are due to the fact the learning processes here are 
excessively politicised.  
  
Re hypothesis 3): learning is more likely when the group is faced with clear evidence of political failure. 
 
According to the quantitative data concerning this hypothesis, members with higher than average unemployment rates 
in their Member States did indeed report a higher degree of learning as a result of their EMCO participation. A positive 
correlation between the unemployment rates in the Member States of the respondent could be established based on the 
quantitative data. Assuming a linear relationship between the variables, a moderate positive Pearson correlationx of 
0.384, the correlation is significant with a p-value of 0.043. In conclusion, the working hypothesis of Hypothesis 3 can 
to some extent be substantiated by the statistical analysis; of course bearing in mind the limited number of respondents 
in the survey.   
 
Re hypothesis 4): learning is more likely in groups in which individuals share a common professional background. 
 
The various presidencies also organize an informal two-to-three day meeting twice annually in which the presidency 
has included an element of socializing. The agenda is often broader, including elements of exchange of policy 
information and academic presentations reflecting the fact that most EMCO members have a longstanding professional 
background in European employment policy. The aim is to further boost the level of professionalism for officials, all of 
whom share a background in the social sciences, i.e. law, economics or political science. 
 
At the same time, the EMCO participants are forced to “sell” the common EMCO opinions to their 
own ministers when they are briefing him or her prior to the Council of Ministers meeting. In this 
manner, the common knowledge of the EMCO is often transformed into what is perceived to be a 
national stock of knowledge regarding employment policy, though often only at the political level.  
 
As far as the EES is concerned, in other words, the learning processes are basically highly 
politicised, meaning that there are fewer shifts in the language-situated relations to other decision-
makers such as, for example, new hegemonic concepts etc., as the professional background is often 
more or less “compromised” by the high degree of politicising. A fact pulling in the same direction 
is that many of the EMCO participants are senior officials from the ministries’ international or 
European relations department, which often has limited contact to the domestic policy departments 
in the ministries. Hence, the ability of the EES to create trajectories of participation is somewhat 
limited. 
 
In conclusion, it is impossible to confirm Hypothesis 4 on the basis of the empirical material in this 
paper. 
 
Re hypothesis 5): learning is more likely when an authoritative member is the persuader. 
 
The fundamental concepts characterizing the EMCO meetings are the twin concepts of flexibility 
and security with regard to rules on notice, maximum working hours, part-time work etc. The 
EMCO debate is normally fragmented into Member States stressing flexibility and security, 
respectively. According to the wing stressing flexibility, increasing labour market flexibility is 
required to unlock dynamics of significance to employment creation, whereas job security 
regulations ought to be modernized with regard to an increased focus on improving employability. 
This wing regards the Commission as a prime defender of “pure” security regulations on the labour 
market together with, among others, France, Luxembourg, Spain, Greece and Belgium. In practice, 
the EMCO decisions are made unanimously, which is, at the same time, a force behind the 
harmonization of the point of view around the fundamental concepts. The final EMCO decisions 
are, therefore, normally a delicate political balance between flexibility and security on the labour 
markets.  
 
The main challenges to the Commission’s situation-defining role have increasingly been issued by 
the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland and occasionally Germany (especially since the 
initiation of the Hartz reform process of the German labour market).  
 
In general, the organization of the EES is a highly centralised political “compromise machine”. Due 
to the tensions within the EMCO and the fight over sentences and concepts, the outcome is 
normally balanced and a result of the argumentative “survival of the fittest”; however, the 
Commission plays the situation-defining role.  
 
At the same time, Member States with a successful employment policy are normally able to act as authoritative EMCO 
members. They are occasionally able to play a persuasive role vis-à-vis the Commission and other Member States. 
Obviously, domestic policy success increases your authority within the EMCO – and vice versa. This will, of course, 
increase the potential learning effects of participating in the EMCO meetings. At the same time, there are clear limits as 
to how much certain Member States (no matter how successful they are) can go against the prevailing and 
argumentative logic within the EMCO as defined by the Commission and the supportive Member States.  
 
The conclusion concerning Hypothesis 5 is that there is a lack of hard empirical evidence to confirm 
it. However, the strong role of the Commission might be an indication of the impossibility of others 
playing the role as an authoritative persuasive member. 
 
4. Data on Nordic Learning Processes in the Employment Field 
Even though the OMC is now connected to the EU, policy coordination along the same lines as in 
the OMC has existed for many years among the Nordic countries (Iceland, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark and the three semi-autonomous areas: Greenland, the Faroe Islands and the 
Aaland Islands). In the employment field, the convention on a common Nordic labour market was 
implemented in 1954. In 1971, this kind of Nordic “hard” law was supplemented with “soft” legal 
coordination procedures, according to which officials as well as various experts meet on a regular 
basis in order to discuss experiences with their national labour market policies. The cornerstone of 
the Nordic learning processes in the employment field is the Nordic Committee of Senior Officials 
for Labour Market and Working Environment (the usual abbreviation used for this committee is 
EKA, which is an acronym of the committee’s Scandinavian name).  
 
The data for this study has been collected using an electronic questionnaire (SurveyXact), which was e-mailed to 
respondents in the Nordic countries on January 10, 2005. The respondents were given approximately three weeks to 
complete the questionnaire.xi Electronic surveys remain a relatively new approach, and a possible source of error 
inherent to this approach in the past has been bias in sampling, as some groups tend to use IT less than others, i.e. senior 
participants.xii This source of error is minimal in this study, however, as the entire population was online. 10 of the 15 
EKA members responded to the questionnaire, providing an acceptable response rate of roughly 67 percent. Although 
the EKA response rate does not raise any serious questions regarding the validity of the survey, the low finite number of 
respondents may cause problems in subsequent statistical analysis, as most statistical models require n to be larger than 
30 in order to be exact.  
 
As in the case of the EMCO, the composite learning index consists of three different indicators based on questions in 
which respondents were asked how often they have learned something new from the Nordic Co-operation; how often 
they have reconsidered or modified their preferences as a result of ideas, knowledge or documentation obtained at the 
meetings; and how often ideas and experiences from other Nordic countries have made a strong impression on them.xiii  
 
As in the questionnaire distributed among the EMCO members, the participants could rate their response to the three 
questions from “Very often” (= 5 points) to “Never” (= 1 pointxiv) or “Don’t know” (= 6, subsequently eliminated). As 
all three indicators contain variables designating the same scale, the learning index can be constructed by simple 
addition, thereby creating an index with a minimum value of three points (no learning) and a maximum value of 15 
points (maximal learning).    
 
In the table below, the composite learning index for the Nordic countries in the EKA is presented. This is – as in the 
case of the EMCO – a necessary digression in the analysis of the paper, as the national differences are used to test the 
hypothesis in the rest of the section. 
 
Table: Composite Learning Index for Nordic Countries in the EKAxv  
 
Country Composite learning index 
Finland 9 
Sweden  10 
Norway 8.5 
Iceland 11 
Faroe Islands  7.5 
Aaland Islands 12 
Greenlandxvi  15 
N = 10. 
 
Ørnsholt & Vestergaard (2003) used the same index (with minor variationsxvii) in their study of the EMCO from 2003. 
Hence, the data from the EMCO and the EKA are perfectly comparable. As was the case in the study of the EMCO, 
however, the tests of partial correlations between the three indicators do raise some preliminary questions. As was 
mentioned in section 3, in order to ensure that the indicators in the index are in fact measuring the same dimension 
without being redundant, partial correlations ought to have a gamma-value of between 0.3 and 0.8. In reality, the 
gamma values of the EKA study were 0.445xviii, 0.407xix and 0.192xx, indicating that ‘Strong Impression’ is not a strong 
indicator to add to the learning index; however, at the same time, it was not a significant source of error. In order to 
ensure comparability with the EMCO survey, the following has therefore been included in the analysis:    
 As in section 3, five hypotheses are suggested as explanations of the learning processes (or lack 
thereof). In the remainder of this section, these hypotheses are analysed on the basis of the 
qualitative and quantitative data. 
 
Re hypothesis 1): learning is more likely when a group meets repeatedly. 
In the employment field, the Nordic ministers meet annually and the EKA meets together semi-annually with a number 
of expert committees (on health and safety at work, safety at work research, on labour law, and on labour market 
policy), which themselves also meet twice a year. In this study, as only one of the respondents had attended less than 
five meetings, this measure was skewed and not a valid parameter for repeated and frequent interaction.  
 
The ministers normally meet in September, and the EKA meets a fortnight before in order to 
prepare the ministerial meeting. In all cases, the meetings last about two days and contain an 
element of socialising. In many ways, the EMCO functions correspond to the EKA, but the number 
of EKA meetings is only half that of the EMCO. This fact points in the direction of a lower learning 
potential in the EKA than in the EMCO. On the other hand, the number of meetings that members 
have attended probably only tells part of the story about the learning potential in the committee, 
also in the case of the EKA. Besides, relative to the EMCO, the EKA meetings are “supported” by a 
large number of expert committees. 
 
The average score on the composite learning index for the 11 respondents of a total number of 14 from the EKA is 
slightly lower than the overall average for the Nordic co-operation in the employment field in general (including all of 
the expert committees), with a score of 9.80 compared to an average of 10.04.  
 
The conclusion concerning Hypothesis 1 is that is impossible to determine whether or not it is 
confirmed on the basis of the data presented in this paper. However, due to the general score on the 
composite learning index, it appears as though the general frequency of meetings in the EKA is at a 
satisfactory level in order not to impair the learning processes. 
 
Re hypothesis 2): learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political pressure. 
 
At all three of the levels – i.e. the ministerial level, senior official level and expert level – involved 
in the Nordic cooperation in the employment field, cooperation is characterised by a very intensive 
exchange of information and a significant degree of autonomy. Each of the participating countries 
produces reports for every meeting regarding the latest developments in the employment field. 
Much of the Nordic meetings are spent on presenting these reports. At the same time, the 
committees on all three levels each have their own budget, which can be used to organize seminars, 
minor research projects etc. in order to exchange views and best practises. At the end of the day, 
however, the EKA determines which of the expert committee projects are to be implemented, and 
the EKA can, at the same time, initiate projects of its own. 
 
All projects concern initiatives where so-called “Nordic utility” is included, i.e. projects where the 
Nordic countries encounter similar problems concerning their national employment policies. 
Examples of these projects are the integration of immigrants into the labour markets; decreasing the 
number of people on sickness absence; statistical questions concerning equal treatment of men and 
women; and health risks in various job functions. The numerous seminars, projects, meetings and 
conferences have created an environment in which mutual learning through a relatively 
decentralised exchange of information and experiences proceeds very quickly among the Nordic 
countries.    
 
No academic research has previously been conducted to analyse the effects of the Nordic “open method of 
coordination” in the employment field. However, one should expect relatively large learning effects due to a relatively 
high degree of de-politicisation owing to the relative autonomous status of the EKA compared to the EMCO, which is 
more insulated from political constraints than is the EMCO. This is also underlined by the budgetary freedom to 
organize projects on mutual learning; the informality and lack of power plays at the Nordic meetings; and the fact that 
the national representatives in Nordic committees often comes from departments which are involved in domestic policy-
making in various areas of the employment policy. Trajectories of participation are hereby created, resulting in larger 
mutual learning effects when everything else is equal.  
 
However, contrary to the working hypothesis, the variable concerning interest on the part of the minister reveals a 
moderately strong positive correlation with learning (gamma = 0.630), and the correlation is significant with a p-value 
of 0.019 below the threshold of 0.05. This means that EKA members have a higher score on the composite learning 
index when their minister is interested in the work proceeding within the EKA; however, the statistics behind this result 
are deemed inadequate, as n is too small. 
 
The variable interest on the part of the state secretary also reflects a moderately strong positive correlation with learning 
(gamma = 0.500), which is at odds with the working hypothesis; however, the correlation here is not significant, with a 
p-value higher than 0.05, at 0.089. 
 
A probable conclusion concerning hypothesis 2 is that political interest from ministers and state secretaries has a 
positive influence on learning; however, only when they maintain this interest at the general level allowing the 
autonomous discussion and free deliberation to proceed. In other words, as far as the facilitation of learning processes is 
concerned, the optimal institutional arrangement appears to be when ministers and state secretaries have a general 
interest in the work of a committee without interfering in the discussions, demanding mandates approved before 
discussions in the committee, and allowing the preparations of the ministerial meetings to occupy only a small part of 
the agenda of the committee.  
 
Re hypothesis 3): learning is more likely when the group encounters clear evidence of political failure. 
 
In the working hypothesis concerning hypothesis 3, it is asserted that the proxy for policy failure in this particular field 
is the unemployment rate. In general, the variation in the size of the unemployment figures is much smaller among the 
Nordic countries than is the case among the European Member States. This ought to indicate a lesser potential for 
learning among the Nordic countries.  
 
This is also confirmed by the data from the EKA study on the grounds that when using the unemployment rate in 2003 
from the Nordic countries as a proxy for political failure, a linear relationship between unemployment and learning can 
be tested (treating both variables as scale). There appears to be no significant relationship in the data, as the p-value is 
0.539 far above the threshold of 0.05. The same holds true when drawing comparisons with the unemployment rate in 
2001.    
 
Hypothesis 3 was confirmed in the analysis concerning the EMCO. At the same time, the conclusion concerning 
hypothesis 3 is, therefore, that one ought to expect a much larger potential for learning in the EMCO than in the EKA. 
  
Re hypothesis 4): learning is more likely in groups in which individuals share a common professional background. 
 
The professional background of the EKA members is the social sciences (law, economics, and political science), as in 
the EMCO. On this basis, it is difficult to find any differences; however, the professional background in the EKA (as 
well as in the EMCO) is reinforced through the professional arrangement concerning employment policy.  
 
On the basis of the empirical evidence concerning the Nordic countries in this paper, it is impossible to confirm 
Hypothesis 4. 
 
Re hypothesis 5): learning is more likely when an authoritative member is persuader. 
 
The secretariat of the Nordic Council of Ministers is represented at all of the EKA meetings, but it 
merely serves as the facilitator and practical organizer of the meetings. The Nordic country holding 
the presidency is normally playing the situation-defining role; however, compared to the EMCO, 
the Nordic meetings are more loosely structured. This is also because relatively few concrete results 
are expected to come out of these meetings. Recommendations and reports are adopted, but this is 
not – as in the case of the EMCO – part of an annual routine, and the public rarely notices it. In 
short, the material concerning whether or not a member is playing the role of an authoritative 
persuader is relatively limited. 
 
In conclusion, on the basis of the empirical evidence concerning the Nordic countries in this paper, it is not possible to 
conclude anything concerning Hypothesis 5. 
 
 
7. OMC Learning Effects: European and Nordic experiences in comparison  
For the 10 respondents from the EKA, the mean score on the composite learning index is 9.8, while the mean score for 
the 21 EMCO respondents is 9.3. On the surface and from this perspective, it can be concluded that the learning effect 
was higher in the EKA than in the EMCO.  
 
In order to accept this conclusion, however, a central underlying assumption must also be accepted: that both variables 
are not measured in a sample, but instead are measured in the entire relevant population. This assumption is supported 
by the fact that the EMCO learning score was calculated for 21 respondents out of a total of 41 possible respondents (a 
response rate of roughly 51 percent), while the EKA learning score was calculated for 10 of 15 possible respondents (a 
response rate of roughly 67 percent). It is clear, however, that any statistical analysis is weakened by the low absolute 
number of respondents, as most statistical models require n to be larger than 30 in order to calculate significance and 
correlations in a valid manner.  
 
When results are treated as samples of a finite population, it is no longer possible to conclude that there is any 
difference in the learning index mean between groups, as the maximum possible value of the EMCO mean in the 
population (9.775) is higher than the minimum possible value of the EKA mean in the population (8.945), meaning that 
the learning index means may be equal in the populations.xxi
 
As has been argued throughout this paper, there are therefore pros and cons as far as the institutional arrangements of 
the EMCO and the EKA are concerned when the aim is to investigate the institutional arrangement facilitating 
transnational learning processes the most. The dimensions of the Nordic learning processes might be somewhat higher 
than among the EU Member States, but the there are undoubtedly also factors found in the European Employment 
Strategy facilitating transnational learning processes which are nonexistent in the Nordic cooperation in the 
employment field such as the more routine decision-making, the more in-dept documentation, and the fact that the EES 
is, in general, taken more seriously than the Nordic cooperation in the employment field. 
   
As far as hypothesis 1 is concerned – which asserts that learning is more likely when groups meet repeatedly – the 
impressionistic indication concerning the EMCO is that attending more meetings may increase respondents’ scores on 
the composite learning index. It was, however, difficult to substantiate this hypothesis using statistical methods. In the 
EKA, this is the case to an even lesser degree. At the same time, a discrepancy between the EMCO and the difference 
between the EMCO and the EKA is that the EMCO meets four times annually, while the EKA only meets semi-
annually. In principle, therefore, the learning potential in the EKA ought to be lower than in the EMCO due to this 
factor alone. However, the relative high score in the EKA seems to indicate that semi-annual meetings are sufficient to 
safeguard a large learning potential. 
 
Hypothesis 2 asserts that learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political pressure. As far as the 
EMCO is concerned, the agenda is governed by the political agenda of the Council of Ministers. Consequently, the 
EMCO negotiations are highly politicised, and the EMCO discussions are akin to a political dogfight from sentence-to-
sentence over the content of the policy recommendations that the committee must send to the Council. All told, this 
reflects a relatively low potential for learning stemming from participation in the EMCO meetings. However, contrary 
to the working hypothesis regarding hypothesis 2, the variable concerning interest on the part of the minister reveals a 
moderately strong correlation with learning. This means that the member of the EKA has a higher score on the 
composite learning index when his or her minister is interested in the EKA work. Although the statistics behind this 
result are inadequate, as n is too small, a probable conclusion concerning this hypothesis is that political interest from 
ministers has a positive influence on transnational learning; however, only when the ministers are not interfering with 
discussions in the committee through “hard” or “soft” mandates, and only when the preparations of the ministerial 
meetings only constitute a small part of the committee agenda. 
 
Hypothesis 3 asserts that learning is more likely when a group encounters clear evidence of political failure that can – in 
the employment field – be interpreted as a high unemployment rate. According to the quantitative data concerning this 
hypothesis, the EMCO members with higher than average unemployment rates in their Member States did indeed report 
a higher degree of learning as a result of their EMCO participation. Assuming a linear relationship between the 
variables, a moderate positive correlation could be established, though one must bear in mind the limited number of 
respondents in the survey. The opposite situation was the case for the Nordic cooperation in the EKA: when using the 
unemployment rate in 2003, there appears to be no significant relationship in the quantitative data. In general, however, 
the variation in the size of the unemployment figures is much smaller among the Nordic countries than among the EU 
Member States. This indicates lesser potential for learning among the Nordic countries. In short, however, the 
hypothesis appears to have been confirmed. 
 
Hypothesis 4 asserts that learning is more likely in groups in which individuals share a common professional 
background. Both in the EMCO and in the EKA, academic presentations and discussions based upon the background of 
the participants in economics, law and political science appear to be a general characteristic intended to further elevate 
the level of professionalism in employment policy. At the same time, the learning potential for this group of people is 
probably somewhat smaller relative to the participants with a specialist education in, for example, medicine. Besides, 
because of the highly and very directly politicised intellectual environment in the EMCO, the common professional 
background might play a less important role in the EMCO, thereby impairing the potential learning processes in the 
EMCO relative to the EKA. However, in short, there is not enough empirical evidence to substantiate Hypothesis 4 in 
this paper. 
 
Hypothesis 5 asserts that learning is more likely when an authoritative member is persuader. There is no hard data 
concerning Hypothesis 5 in this paper. On the one hand, the Commission is playing the situation-defining role in the 
EMCO, whereas it is the country holding the presidency in the EKA. This might point in the direction of a higher 
learning potential in the EKA if the country holding the presidency has the necessary authority, which the Commission 
often lacks on the grounds that it is perceived to belong to the “employment protection wing” of the EMCO. This might 
point in the direction of larger learning effects in the EKA. On the other hand, the EKA is more loosely structured. This 
is because relatively few concrete results are expected to come out of the EKA meetings. Recommendations and reports 
are adopted, but this is not – as in the EMCO – part of a yearly routine and is hardly ever noticed by the public. This 
might point in the direction of fewer learning effects at the Nordic level, as at least the same level of interest from the 
political level appears to facilitate learning, cf. Hypothesis 2.    
 
8. Conclusion 
In the introduction to this paper, three questions were addressed concerning the transnational learning processes in the 
EU and among the Nordic countries: first, what characterizes the mutual learning processes of the OMC in the EU 
employment field? Second, what characterizes the mutual learning processes among the Nordic countries in their 
cooperation in the employment field? Third, and most importantly, when comparing the experiences with the learning 
processes in the EU and among the Nordic countries, what are the reasons for the apparent differences on how mutual 
or transnational learning processes are most efficiently diffused or facilitated among a group of Member States?  
 
Transnational learning processes in the EU employment field have a number of specific characteristics. The participants 
meet frequently and regularly, creating a solid basis for potential learning processes. However, the meetings of the 
European Employment Committee are totally governed by the agenda of the Council of Ministers and, therefore, highly 
politicised. This fact reduces the efficacy of the potential learning processes. At the same time, the fact that variations in 
political failures in the employment field are relatively large in the EU increases the learning effects, according to 
participants. The professional background is the usual generalist education in various social science disciplines, though 
naturally with a longstanding specific knowledge in employment policy. Finally, there is no actor with persuasive 
authority facilitating the European learning processes. 
 
Transnational learning processes in the employment field among the Nordic countries also have a number of specific 
characteristics. Participants meet on a regular basis two times a year. The meetings are highly depoliticised, allowing 
room for a free and open exchange of views and information on employment policy; basically, this facilitates 
transnational learning processes. However, the present paper also points to the fact that some degree of political interest 
on the part of the minister actually facilitates the transnational learning processes among the Nordic countries. The 
Nordic countries lack great variations in the unemployment figures, meaning that the potential is somewhat reduced. 
The professional background of the officials engaged in the Nordic cooperation is the same as for the participants in the 
European co-operation, however, more Nordic officials hail from domestic policy departments in their national 
bureaucracies, which increases the learning potential. 
 
When comparing the experiences with transnational learning processes in the EU and among the Nordic countries, I 
will tentatively suggest that an optimal institutional setting intended to facilitate the transnational learning processes 
would be one which  
• means that officials meet on a regular basis two times annually or more;  
• has a system of expert committees that supports the international committees for cooperation with expertise; 
• involves the relevant ministers and state secretaries to an extent to which they display an interest in the work 
dealing with transnational learning processes; 
• ministers avoid directly interfering in discussions in the work of the committees through mandates;  
• sets up the institution in order to organize the learning processes, allowing considerable room for deliberation; 
• sets up the institution in order to function as more than an organ that merely prepares meetings at the political 
level;  
• concentrates the transnational learning processes on efforts in policy areas where the variations in the policy 
results are large;  
• involves officials that are persons with a longstanding professional background; and 
• chooses persons for international work with transnational learning processes that possess an authority in 
domestic policy making and administrative work. 
 
However, much more research appears to be necessary in order to investigate all of the aspects of transnational learning 
processes among the European Union Member States and the Nordic countries. Several of the hypotheses listed in this 
paper have not been sufficiently substantiated, as the empirical evidence in the collected data was too weak. Obviously, 
the methodology used should be supplemented with interviews of relevant participants in the analysed learning 
processes. At the same time, there would appear to be reason to believe that the need to understand the learning 
processes in the international and political sphere will grow dramatically in the years to come as the traditional 
regulatory methods are exhausted.   
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i I would like to thank my research assistants, Thomas Horn and Kasper Lindskow, for their assistance in preparing this 
paper. I would also like to thank Ove Kaj Pedersen, Maja Lotz, Lars Bo Kaspersen, Tore Olsen and Carsten Greve who 
forced me to think things over once again. 
ii Norway, Iceland and the semi-autonomous areas of Greenland and the Faroe Islands are not members of the European 
Union. 
iii Transnational learning and mutual learning are used as synonymous concepts in this paper.  
iv ‘Concept’ is used here in accordance with Wittgenstein’s terminology; political theorists may note that it is applied 
here with predominantly philosophical connotations. 
v The internal processes that facilitate learning processes understood as the harmonization of linguistic categories and 
acceptance of new concepts might be initiated from the outside, but they nonetheless function internally and are 
categorized accordingly. 
vi In the current questionnaire, “Very often” is designated (1), and “Never” is designated (5), but the numbers must be 
inverted in order to construct a valid index; otherwise a low score on the index would imply a high degree of learning. 
Ørnsholt & Vestergaard (2003) designated “Very often” (5) and “Never” (1). 
vii A gamma value can be defined as a symmetric measure of the association between two ordinal variables ranging 
between negative 1 and 1. Values close to an absolute value of 1 indicate a strong relationship between the two 
variables. Values close to zero indicate little or no relationship.
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
viii The alpha value for the index that designates overall reliability also rises from 0.66 to 0.76 when “Strong 
impression” is left out, meaning that the learning index is more reliable when “Strong impression” is not included as an 
indicator. The alpha value can be defined as a model of internal consistency as based on the average inter-item 
correlation.  
ix The secretariat of the Council of Ministers is also represented at the EMCO meetings, but normally remains very 
quiet. 
x The Pearson correlation coefficient measures the linear association between two scale variables. 
xi On account of problems with e-mail addresses, five e-mails were sent between January 11 and January 17. Over the 
course of the process, several reminders were sent to respondents who had not yet answered.  
xii Ørnsholt & Vestergaard (2003) also used electronic questionnaires. They noted that the response rate for respondents 
in some Member States with less Internet penetration was slightly lower than average; however, they attempted to 
compensate for this bias by posting printed questionnaires upon request.  
xiii See section 3 for the exact wording of these three questions. 
xivIn the current questionnaire, “Very often” is designated (1), and “Never” is designated (5), but the numbers must be 
inverted in order to construct a valid index; otherwise a low score on the index would imply a high degree of learning. 
Ørnsholt & Vestergaard (2003) designated “Very often” (5) and “Never” (1). 
xv Denmark is not mentioned in the table, as the Danish representative did not answer all of the questions relevant to the 
construction of the learning index. 
xvi Although the respondent from Greenland may be an outlier, the response does fit with other measures, that is, that the 
answers from the respondents fit the questions on learning in the questionnaire.  
xvii The words “Open Method of Coordination” have been substituted with “Nordic Co-operation” in the questionnaire 
for this study. 
xviii Partial correlation on the questions concerning “New knowledge” (question 1 in section 3) and “Preferences” 
(question 3 in section 3) controlling for “Strong Impression” (question 2 in section 3).   
xix Partial correlation on the questions concerning “New knowledge” (question 1 in section 3) and “Strong Impression” 
(question 2 in section 3) controlling for “Preferences” (question 3 in section 3). 
xx Partial correlation on the questions concerning “Strong Impression” (question 2 in section 3) and “Preferences” 
(question 3 in section 3) controlling for “New knowledge” (question 1 in section 3). 
xxi This problem can be illustrated by treating the results from both of the above groups as samples of finite populations. 
If both learning index means have been compiled on the basis of samples, then the uncertainty caused by inferring from 
a sample to a population also must be added to the equation by calculating a confidence interval: for the EMCO group, 
the standard error of mean is 0.353, whereas the correction for a finite population is a factor of 0.707, and a z-score of 
1.96 is chosen. The standard error of mean was calculated by SPSS, while the finite population correction factor =√ (( N 
– n ) / ( N – 1 )), has been calculated by inserting N = 41 and n = 21, and the z-score of 1.96 is for a 95 percent 
confidence interval, meaning that the mean will be within the calculated range in 95 percent of cases. The mean for the 
population is calculated as mean +/- standard error x z-score x correction factor. The same goes for the EKA 
calculations. The calculated mean for the EMCO population is then 9.286 +/- 0.489. For the EKA group, the standard 
error of mean is 0.786, whereas the correction for a finite population is a factor of 0.555, and the z-score of 1.96 is again 
chosen. The calculated mean for the EKA population is then 9.8 +/- 0.855. 
 
